Emission efficiency and the Swedish charge and refund system for nitrogen oxides by Larsson, Sofia
 
 
Master’s thesis  ·  30 hec  ·  Advanced level  
Environmental Economics and Management - Master’s Programme  
Degree thesis No 961  ·  ISSN 1401-4084 
Uppsala 2015 
iiii 
 
 
 
Emission Efficiency and the Swedish 
charge and refund system for nitrogen 
oxides  
- An empricial firm level analysis of the development of NOX 
emissions per unit of energy produced, 1992 - 2013 
 
 
Sofia Larsson 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Emission Efficiency and the Swedish charge and refund system for nitrogen oxides 
- An empricial firm level analysis of the development of NOX emissions per unit of energy 
produced, 1992 - 2013 
 
 
Sofia Larsson 
 
 
Supervisor: Rob Hart, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences
 Department of Economics 
 
Assistant supervisor: Justice Tei Mensah, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences 
 Department of Economics 
 
Examiner: Sebastian Hess, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences 
 Department of Economics 
 
 
Credits:  30 hec 
Level: A2E 
Course title: Independent project in Economics E 
Course code: EX0537 
Programme/Education: Environmental Economics and Management, 
Master’s Programme 
Faculty: Faculty of Natural Resources and Agricultural Sciences 
 
Place of publication: Uppsala 
Year of publication: 2015 
Cover picture: District heating power plant in Haparanda, Sofia Larsson, Swedish 
University of Agricultural Sciences 
Name of Series: Degree project/SLU, Department of Economics 
No: 961 
ISSN 1401-4084 
Online publication: http://stud.epsilon.slu.se 
 
 
Key words: charge and refund system, emission abatement, envinronmental policy, 
nitrogen oxides, NOX charge 
 
 
i 
Acknowledgement  
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to all of you who have supported and 
helped me during the realization of this master thesis. In particular I would like to 
thank my supervisor Rob Hart for the time and knowledge he dedicated during the 
process of writing this thesis. I’m grateful for his guidance, constructive criticism 
and professional advices during this project. I would also like to express my grate-
fulness to PhD candidate Justice Tei Mensah for giving me invaluable help. 
 
I also want to express my thankfulness to my beloved family and friends for all 
support and encouragement, you all gave me a lot of energy during the process of 
this thesis. Finally, I want to express my deepest gratefulness to my beloved life 
companion, Yemel Aisa, for supporting, encouraging and believing in me during 
these last months. 
 
Without all of you, this project would not have been able to accomplish.  
 
 
Sofia Larsson 
June 2015 
 
 
ii 
Abstract 
According to the recently updated version of the framework of Planetary Boundaries, hu-
man society has crossed the sustainable level of four out of nine planetary boundaries. Two 
of those are beyond the zone of uncertainty and in the zone of high risk of serious impacts 
on the Earth System. It is an alarming situation. In prevailing economical system one way 
to handle emission abatement, overconsumption of natural resources and anthropogenic 
natural degradation is environmental policy. 
The purpose of this study is to empirically evaluate whether the environmental policy the 
charge and refund system for nitrogen oxides on large industrial combustion and energy 
generating production units in Sweden had an impact on emissions of nitrogen oxides per 
unit of energy produced at a firm level, sector aggregated as well as on a sectorial analysis. 
Econometric regression models are used on panel data for 272 firms in seven different 
sectors covered by the charge and refund system for nitrogen oxides during the period 1992 
– 2013 to estimate the effect of the real charge level and the increase in the charge in 2008. 
The results from the study finds that in a sector aggregated analysis the estimations is a 
negative and statistically significant impact on NOX emissions per produced unit of energy 
at a firm level for both the real charge as the increase in the nominal charge in 2008. In a 
sectorial analysis the estimations for the real charge and the nominal increase is negative 
and statistically significant for the wood industry. 
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1 Introduction 
According to the recently updated version of the framework of Planetary Bounda-
ries, human society has crossed the sustainable level of four out of nine planetary 
boundaries (Steffen et al., 2015). Two of those are beyond the zone of uncertainty 
and in the zone of high risk of serious impacts on the Earth System. It is an alarm-
ing situation and the authors states that “there is an urgent need for a new para-
digm that integrates the continued development of human societies and the mainte-
nance of the Earth system in a resilient and accommodating state”. In prevailing 
economical system one way to handle emission abatement, overconsumption of 
natural resources and anthropogenic natural degradation is environmental policy. 
Command and control policies legislate levels of pollutions firms are allowed to 
emit and policies as taxes and subsidies give economic incentives to firms and 
individuals to behave more sustainably. That politicians rely on environmental 
polices for emission abatement to a large extent is obvious when the revenue from 
environmental taxes constitutes on average around 2% of GDP in OECD countries 
(OECD, 2001). This is the case also in Sweden where the value of environmental 
taxes amounted to 89 064 million SEK in 2013 (SCB, 2015a) which was 2,36% of 
the Swedish GDP current year. But the question is: are those policies efficient 
enough in having a real impact on reducing emissions, overconsumption of natural 
resources and anthropogenic natural degradation? Evaluation of these polices is 
therefore of major concern. The purpose of this study is to evaluate one such envi-
ronmental policy, the economic instrument the charge and refund system for nitro-
gen oxides (NOX charge) for large combustion plants in Sweden. The NOX charge 
is a combination of a tax and a subsidy; taxing production units based on emissions 
and recharges the same units based on energy output (SEPA, 2015a). Seven differ-
ent sectors are covered by the charge and refund system for nitrogen oxides; food-, 
wood- and paper- and pulp industry, chemical production, metal manufacturing, 
waste incineration and power- and heat generation. 
The Swedish NOX charge have been studied by Höglund-Isaksson and Sterner 
(2000) where they provide a description of the scheme and an assessment of sys-
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tems initially effectiveness. Höglund-Isaksson (2005) provides empirical estimates 
of abatement cost functions for NOX emissions in three industrial sectors in Swe-
den and within a theoretical model of NOX emissions Sterner and Höglund-
Isaksson (2006) articulates the empirical findings. Sterner and Turnheim (2009) 
further test the effectiveness of specific abatement technologies in diminishing 
emissions under the Swedish charge and refund system for nitrogen oxides. In a 
European context the French system of air pollution control and its effectiveness 
have been analysed by Millock and Nauges (2003, 2006) and the Australian NOX 
tax scheme have been analysed by Ancev, Betz and Contreras (2012). OECD 
(2010) provides an overview of a number of cases studies for environmental tax 
schemes in different countries such as UK, Spain, Korea and Japan where also the 
Swedish NOX charge is included.  
According to Baumol and Oates (1988) the monetary incentive from an envi-
ronmental tax should translate into targeted actors implementing abatement 
measures to diminish their exposure to the tax until the marginal cost of emission 
abatement is equal to the tax. Höglund (2000) and Höglund and Sterner, (2000) 
finds that the abatement incentives are practically the same under a charge and 
refund system as under an equivalent Pigouvian tax when there are a large number 
of small and competitive firms. Höglund (2000) further states that the abetment 
cost per kilo NOX emissions for the firms covered by the charge and refund system 
for nitrogen oxides in Sweden is approximately equal to the charge level. Therefore 
firms are theoretically expected to invest in emission abatement until the marginal 
cost equals the charge level. The question is; does the NOX charge affect emissions 
and emission efficiency based on empirically research? A previous econometric 
study of the charge and refund system for nitrogen oxides is a discussion paper by 
Wikström (2015) in which no significant effect is found of the increase of the 
charge in 2008 neither on total emissions nor emission efficiency at a production 
unit level, neither on a sector aggregated nor as on a sectorial analysis. An evalua-
tion of the increase in the charge level in 2008 by the Swedish Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (2012) neither finds any significant effect of the increase in the 
charge level neither on aggregated emissions nor emission efficiency. Still the sys-
tem is internationally acknowledged as an efficient policy in terms of emission 
abatement (Wright and Mallia, 2003), (Sterner and Turnheim, 2009), (OECD, 
2013). Cato (2010) also states that a tax and refund system works efficiently in a 
market with endogenous entry. In a comparison of the Swedish and the French 
system by Millock, Nauges and Sterner (2004) they find that the design of the 
Swedish charge and refund system for nitrogen oxides made it more efficient in 
terms of emission abatement than the French tax-system for nitrogen oxides. In 
comparison with other OECD countries, Sweden also performs well in terms of 
NOX emissions per unit of energy produced (OECD, 2013). Still the industries are 
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competitive on a global market, so it might not be a contradiction between envi-
ronmental regulation and competitiveness, as Porter and van der Linde (1995) con-
cludes when arguing that stringent, properly designed, environmental standards can 
trigger innovation that may partially or more then offsets the cost of complying to 
them and that environmental regulation can increase industrial competitiveness. 
Previous econometric studies treat emission efficiency at a production unit level 
and not at a firm level. Decisions about emission abatement investments are taken 
by managers, they don’t just happen. And it is reasonable to suppose that managers 
make decisions at the firm level, not the production unit level. The aim of this 
study is therefore to empirically investigate whether the charge and refund system 
for nitrogen oxides on large industrial combustion and energy generating produc-
tion units in Sweden had any impact on nitrogen oxide emissions per unit of energy 
produced at a firm level. The data, consisting emissions and produced energy at a 
production unit level, is received from the Swedish Environmental Protection 
Agency (SEPA) and to estimate the effect of the NOX charge on emission efficien-
cy the econometric methods pooled, fixed effects as random effects model with 
panel data is used on a sector aggregated as well as on a sectorial analysis.  
The econometrics result from the study finds that in a sector aggregated analysis 
the estimations from the pooled model is a negative and statistically significant 
impact on NOX emissions per produced unit of energy at a firm level for both the 
real charge as the increase in the nominal charge in 2008. In a sectorial analysis the 
estimations for the real charge and the nominal increase is negative and statistically 
significant for the wood industry. 
The structure of the thesis starts with a background about nitrogen oxides and 
the charge and refund system in section 2. Section 3 describes the data, followed by 
section 4 stating methodology and model. The study ends with section 5 describing 
results, followed by a discussion and finally section 7 concludes.  
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2 Background 
Below will be given a brief description of nitrogen oxides and the charge and re-
fund system for nitrogen oxides for large combustion plants in Sweden.  
2.1 Nitrogen oxides 
The term nitrogen oxides refers to a group of compounds denoted by the chemical 
abbreviation NOX. Nitrogen is an essential element for all living organisms and is 
the most abundant gas in Earth’s atmosphere. Nitrogen oxides are a group of chem-
ical compounds, among the most important are the gases nitrogen oxide (NO) and 
nitrogen dioxide (NO2), that are produced from a reaction between nitrogen and 
oxygen in the air during combustion, especially at high temperatures, as in engines 
and power station boilers (OECD, 2013). Main anthropogenic sources of emission 
are combustion of fossil fuels in automobile engines and power plants (Ahammad, 
2013). Emissions from automobiles correspond to about three-quarters of global 
NOX emissions. Further sources of NOX emissions are the industrial sector as refin-
eries and manufacturing facilities and residential sector as gas stoves and home 
heating units.  
During conventional combustion of petroleum or bio-based fuels atmospheric or 
molecular form of nitrogen is the main source of nitrogen of NOX formation. In 
general combustion with biofuel reduces emissions as CO, HC and PM, but causes 
higher emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOX). NOX is generally formed in high tem-
peratures on atmospheric nitrogen and does not come from an impurity in the fuel, 
for example like sulphur (Sterner and Köhlin, 2003). 
2.1.1 Human and environmental impacts of nitrogen oxides 
Nitrogen oxides form nitric acid when dissolved in atmospheric moisture, which is 
a component in acid rain. Nitrogen oxides further contribute to the formation of 
ground-level ozone, smog, that has a negative impact on vegetation and human 
health, such as respiratory and cardiovascular problems (OECD, 2013). Specific 
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concentrations of some nitrogen compounds, in principal NO2, have proven toxic 
effects. High concentrations can be fatal and low levels have effects on different 
physiological systems, particularly lung tissue. Long-term exposure of NOX com-
pounds weakens resistance to respiratory infections (Ahammad, 2013).  
Environmental impacts from NOX emissions are contribution to global warming, 
since NO is an important component in the formation of the potent greenhouse gas 
tropospheric ozone (Palash et al., 2013), acid rain in which NOX constitute a key 
element and it also hampers plant growth (Ahammad, 2013). It causes acidification 
of land and water areas, as well as eutrophication of lakes, rivers and seas 
(Svärdsjö and Gustafsson, 2003). It further can react with other pollutants to form 
toxic chemicals (Ahammad, 2013).  
2.1.2 Nitrogen emissions in Sweden 
A large part of Scandinavia has old geological structures with low levels of calci-
um and due to this low buffering capacity. Sweden has a naturally acidic soil and is 
therefore sensitive to acid deposition (OECD, 2013). Sweden is one of the coun-
tries that have been largely affected by acid rain leading to considerable negative 
effects on land, lake and forest ecosystems. This is one of the reasons why Sweden 
has adapted a policy on nitrogen oxide emissions (Sterner and Höglund Isaksson, 
2006). 
In Sweden around 50 - 60 % of total NOX emissions originates from the 
transport sector, or mobile sources. The largest share is from vehicle transportation 
sector and shipping sector. The industrial sector and working machines further 
contributes with a significant share. Below is a figure of total NOX emissions in 
Sweden.  
 
Figure 2.1 Total airborne NOX emissions in Sweden 1992 -2013, thousands ton  
Source: Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA, 2015)  
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Mobile sources have decreased NOX emissions by 59% between 1992 and 2013, 
and the share of mobile sources has been decreasing from 66% to 56% of total 
NOX emissions. Stationary sources have decreased emissions by 39%, and the 
share of stationary sources has increased from 34% to 44% of total NOX emissions. 
Total NOX emissions from stationary sources covered by the NOX charge have 
decreased by 14%, while the share has increased from 6% to 10%. Stationary 
sources not covered by the NOX charge have decreased emissions by 44% and their 
share has increased from 28% to 34%.  
2.2 The Charge and Refund system for emissions of nitrogen 
oxides in Sweden 
The charge and refund system for nitrogen oxides (referred as the NOX charge from 
now on) for large industrial combustions plants in Sweden was one of the first and 
most important environmental taxes introduced in Sweden during the 1990s 
(Höglund, 2000). The NOX charge was implemented the 1 January 1992 (Svärdsjö 
and Gustafsson, 2003). Heat and energy production units such as boilers, stationary 
combustion engines and gas turbines are obliged to pay the charge for NOX emis-
sions. The Swedish parliament had earlier implemented non-tradable permits, lim-
its, as a strategy to combat NOX emissions from stationary combustion plants, but it 
rapidly became clear that these limits would not reduce emissions quickly enough 
(OECD, 2013). Since NOX emissions to a large extent depends on the technology 
used and the maintenance of combustion equipment, other strategies than just tax-
ing fuel was needed (Sterner and Höglund Isaksson, 2006). A high tax rate was 
needed, but opposition and lobbying was expected. The equipment was quite ex-
pensive and was considered unreasonable for small production units (Sterner and 
Turnheim, 2009). If the tax was supposed to be implemented only on large firms, 
this could cause incentives for firms to switch to smaller, and hence less efficient, 
production units (Sterner and Höglund Isaksson, 2006). After a couple of years 
innovation enabled lower cost of monitoring equipment making it possible to in-
clude smaller production units (Sterner and Turnheim, 2009). Initially the system 
comprised production units with an annual useful output of energy produced larger 
than 50 Giga Watt Hours (GWh), in total 181 production unites. In the following 
three years mean emissions per unit of energy produced fell with 30% among these 
production units. A few years later, in 1996, the system was extended to comprise 
plants producing more than 40 GWh annually, and then including 274 production 
units. One year later, in 1997, it was further extended to comprise production units 
producing more than 25 GWh annually, totally 371 production units. In 2013 total-
ly 422 production units at 280 plants were included. Figure 1.2. below shows the 
development of NOX emissions per produced unit of energy per group of size of 
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the production units that got covered gradually by the charge. The emissions per 
produced unit of energy decreased initially for all of the three groups but the emis-
sion reduction gradually levelled off. 
  
The initial nominal charge was 40 SEK per emitted kilo of nitrogen oxide. In 
2008 the charge level was increased to 50 SEK per kg NOX, in nominal terms. The 
initial charge of 40 SEK/kg corresponds to about 4 300 €/ton or 6 300 USD/ton. 
This could be compared to permit prices that are around the hundreds of dollars in 
the US programs for NOX permits.  A few other countries in Europe have NOX 
charges, like France, Italy and Galicia in Spain, and all these have charge levels 
about 150 USD/ ton (Sterner and Höglund Isaksson, 2006) and the charge levels in 
France was between 27 – 51 €/ton (Sterner and Turnheim, 2009). 
The total revenue that the environmental charge generates, 668 million SEK in 
2013 (SCB, 2015a), is refunded to the production units based on the amount of 
each unit’s energy produced as a share of total useful energy production. Refund-
ing reduces the incentives to switch to smaller and less efficient production units 
(Sterner and Höglund Isaksson, 2006). The idea of the system is to benefit emis-
sion efficient production units, with relatively low NOX emissions compared to 
energy output. This means that firms emitting low levels of NOX per unit of energy 
produced are net beneficiaries and firms with large NOX emissions per unit of en-
ergy produced are net taxpayers. The whole value of the total charge are refunded 
to the firms, except for administrative costs that are appreciated to be 0,7% of the 
total charge (Svärdsjö and Gustafsson, 2003).  The targeted group is therefore left 
financially neutral except from abatement and transaction costs.  
 
Figure 2.2. kg NOX per produced GWh per extended group 
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3 Data 
The original data used for the analysis is secondary data provided by the Swedish 
Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) containing individual production unit 
data for the period 1992 to 2013. It is multiple time period panel data that contains 
7 989 observations between the years 1992 and 2013, a period of T=22 years. Each 
observation is quantity kilo (kg) NOX-emission and Mega Watt Hours (MWh) en-
ergy produced for each production unit. It is also information about sector, plant 
number, firm and cleaning method. Some information is confidential and is for this 
reason never exposed publicly. 
Production units covered by the charge have more then doubled during the peri-
od of observation; it has been increasing from 181 production units in 1992 to 422 
in 2013. Some plants have several production units and some firms have several 
plants. Production units enter and exit the market during the period of observation. 
Some production units have observations for all 22 years, some for several years 
and a few for just a couple or one year. This implies that the original panel data is 
unbalanced, which means that there are missing observations for some periods for 
some entities.  
There are seven different sectors covered by the charge and refund system that 
appears in the data; food-, wood- and paper- and pulp industry, chemical produc-
tion, metal manufacturing, waste incineration and power- and heat generation. 
Power and heat generation is the largest sector in the data and metal manufacturing 
the sector with fewest production units and therefore fewest observations appearing 
in the data. 
To calculate the real value of the NOX charge and the global oil price data about 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) from Statistics Sweden (SCB, 2015b) between the 
years 1992 and 2013 is used.  
 
To be able to do the stated analysis on how the NOX charge have affected the 
emissions efficiency on a firm level the data have been collapsed to firm level. 
Observations of production unit information have been summarized to firm level 
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per year of observation and the observed emissions per produced unit of energy is 
therefore a mean of kilo emitted NOX per produced GWh for all different produc-
tion units per firm. In the original data different firms have different number of 
production units and some firms may even just have one production unit. The mean 
per firm then consists of different numbers of production units, depending on the 
quantity production units per firm in the original data. Since 14 of the firms had 
less then 2 observations, those have been excluded from the data. The modified 
data set consists of observations for n=272 different firms for the time period of 
observation between 1992 and 2013, T=22, with a total of 272x22 = 5 984 observa-
tions. Some firms have production in different sectors, in total 21 nr of firms, out of 
the total 272 nr of firms. To be able to do the analysis these firms have been sepa-
rated and treated as two different firms, since decisions probably are taken differ-
ently in production in different sectors. The new panel data set is unbalanced with 
several missing values for some or several years for a majority of the firms. Out of 
the total 272 firms, 80 have observations for all 22 years. The data set has 3 629 
observations and hence 2 292 missing values since firms enter and exit the data set 
during the period of observation.  
The figure below shows firms per sector during the period of observation, in to-
tal 272 firms.  
3.1 Energy production, emissions and emission efficiency 
Total energy output by firms covered by the NOX charge has doubled during the 
period of observation. It has increased by 94% from 37 465 GWh in 1992 to 72 
909,2 GWh in 2013. Emissions is fluctuating a lot from year to year but has de-
creased by 13,5% from 15 249,58 ton NOX in 1992 to 13 185,3 ton in 2013. Emis-
sion efficiency, which is emitted kilo NOX per GWh produced energy, has in-
creased by 55,6% during the period from 407,04 kg NOX per GWh in 1992 to 
 
 
  Figure 3.1 Firms per sector, total number for all years 1992 - 2013 
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180,8 kg NOX per GWh in 2013. Most of the increase in emission efficiency takes 
place in the first five years. The best firms have cut their emission efficiency by 
more then 70% and the median firms have caught up with best practice, both the 
best and the worst performance level have improved, but the worst has improved 
faster (Sterner and Turnheim, 2009). Figure 3.2 to 3.4 shows this information 
graphically.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Total GWh per year, all sectors 
 
 Figure 3.3. Total NOx emissions per year, ton, 
all sectors 
 
 Figure 3.4. Mean kg NOx per GWh, all sectors 
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3.1.1 Energy production, emissions and emission efficiency per sector 
Energy production, emissions and emission efficiency differs between the seven 
sectors. Power and heat generation, which is the largest sector covered by the NOX 
charge, has increased energy production by 123% from 18 151,45 GWh in 1992 to 
40 475,32 GWh in 2013. Emissions is almost the same by a decrease by less then 
1% from 6 731,1 ton in 1992 to 6 684,5 ton in 2013. Emission efficiency has in-
creased by 55,5% from 370,8 kg NOX per produced GWh to 165,2 kg NOX per 
produced GWh.  
Waste incineration, which is the third largest sector covered by the NOX charge, 
has increased energy production by 166% from 4 936,8 GWh in 1992 to 13 148,1 
GWh in 2013. Emissions has decreased by 25% from 2 557,2 ton in 1992 to 1 
916,8 ton in 2013. The largest increase in emission efficiency has occurred in this 
sector by an increase of 71,9%, from 518 kg NOX per produced GWh to 145,8 kg 
NOX per produced GWh.  
Pulp- and paper industry, which is the second largest sector covered by the NOX 
charge, has increased energy production by 15% from 10 609 GWh in 1992 to 12 
229 GWh in 2013. Emissions has decreased by 34,6% from 4 531 ton in 1992 to 2 
964,3 ton in 2013. Emission efficiency has increased by 43%, from 427 kg NOX 
per produced GWh to 242,4 kg NOX per produced GWh.  
Wood industry had the largest increase in energy production by 3 405,8% in-
crease from 70,9 GWh in 1992 to 2 485,63 GWh in 2013. Correspondingly emis-
sions has increased by 2 065,7% from 37,2 ton in 1992 to 805,5 ton in 2013. Emis-
sion efficiency has increased by 38%, from 524,6 kg NOX per produced GWh to 
324,067 kg NOX per produced GWh.  
Chemical industry has increased in energy production by 34% from 2 299,4 
GWh in 1992 to 3 080,75 GWh in 2013. Emissions has decreased by 50% from 1 
051,4 ton in 1992 to 525,3 ton in 2013. Emission efficiency has increased by 
62,7%, from 457,3 kg NOX per produced GWh to 170,5 kg NOX per produced 
GWh.  
Food industry has increased the energy production by 9,8% from 937,8 GWh in 
1992 to 1 029,23 GWh in 2013. Emissions has decreased by 50% from 264,6 ton in 
1992 to 171 ton in 2013. Emission efficiency has increased by 41%, from 282,2 kg 
NOX per produced GWh to 166,2 kg NOX per produced GWh.  
Metal industry has almost the same energy production with less than 1% in-
crease, from 459,3 GWh in 1992 to 461 GWh in 2013. Emissions have increased 
by 53% from 77 ton in 1992 to 117,8 ton in 2013. Emission efficiency has de-
creased by 52%, from 167,6 kg NOX per produced GWh to 255,4 kg NOX per pro-
duced GWh. The results from the metal industry should be interpreted with caution 
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since there are very few observations from this sector since there are only 4 firms 
represented during the period of observation. Figure 3.5 – 3.8 shows the infor-
mation graphically. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5. Changes in % of energy production, emissions and emission 
efficiency per sector 
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Figure 3.6. Total energy produced per sector, GWh 
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Figure 3.7. Total NOX emissions per sector, ton 
 
Figure 3.8. Mean emission efficiency per sector, kg NOX per GWh 
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4 Methodology 
A common problem for evaluations of environmental policies, and polices in gen-
eral, is the absent of a control group. In the case of the NOX charge the measure of 
NOX emissions started together with the implementation of the policy. Therefore it 
is difficult to know the effect of the policy since we don’t know how the emission 
efficiency would have developed in the absent of the policy. Methods for trying to 
evaluate these types of problems could be found in econometrics and is used to test 
the null hypothesis that the NOX charge didn’t have any effect on emission effi-
ciency1 on a firm level, on all sectors aggregated as well as a sectorial analysis. 
4.1 Panel Data  
Three different kinds of data can be used when applying an econometric quantita-
tive analysis; cross-sectional, time-series and panel data (Stock and Watson, 2011). 
Cross-sectional data are collections of data for one specific point in time across a 
sample of different individuals, countries, regions, firms, households or other entity 
of observation. Time-series data on the other hand is data collected for several pe-
riods, or points in time for one specific individual, country, region, firm, household 
or other entity of observation. Panel data is the combination of cross-sectional and 
time-series data. Panel data consist of observations for different (n) entities (indi-
viduals, countries, households, firms, regions or other entity of observation) for 
two or several different time periods (T) (Baum, 2006). An example of an econo-
metric model with panel data is; 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋1𝑖𝑡 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡 
 
where i=1, 2, …,N different entities and t=1,2,…,T different time periods.  
                                                   
1 Emission efficiency is NOX emissions per produced unit of energy. When efficiency increase, 
NOX emission per produced unit of energy decrease.   
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A way to eliminate the effect of omitted variables that differ across entities but 
are constant over time is to study changes in the dependent variable over time 
(Stock and Watson, 2011), this could be done with panel data. A panel data set can 
control for unobserved variables that differ from one entity to another but does not 
change over time. It can also control for variables that vary over time but are equal 
across entities. 
4.1.1 A fixed effects model 
A fixed effect regression is used to test the effect of the NOX charge on emission 
efficiency. Fixed effects regression is the main tool for regression on panel data 
and is an extension of the multiple regression tool that enables for controlling for 
omitted variables that differ across entities but are constant over time (Stock and 
Watson, 2011). Fixed effect regressions can be used when there are two or more 
time observations for each entity. The fixed effect regression model has one differ-
ent intercept for each entity. An example of a panel data model with fixed effects 
is: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑍𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡  
 
where 𝑖=1, 2, …,N different entities and 𝑡=1,2,…,T different time periods, 𝛼 is 
an entity specific intercept and 𝑍𝑖  is an unobserved variable that varies across enti-
ties but does not change over time. 
Using fixed effect implies that any characteristic that does not vary over time for 
each unit cannot be included in the regression model, for example an individuals 
gender or a firm’s sector code (Baum, 2006). This implies that it’s not possible to 
use sector dummies in the model for the seven different sectors. Even though fixed 
effects model is straightforward to apply, it expensive in terms of degrees of free-
dom when having several cross section units (Gujarati, 2002). This is certainly the 
case with the firms covered by the NOX charge, when the firms are 272 while the 
periods only are 22. The underlying reasoning of the fixed effects model is that 
when specifying the regression model there is failure to include relevant explanato-
ry variables that doesn’t charge over time and that including dummy variables is a 
cover up for the inability to specify a correct model. Therefore another model, a 
random effects model, could be worth testing.  
4.1.2 A random effects model 
In a generalized least squares (GLS) random effects model the 𝑢𝑖 term is treated as 
a random variable and we assume that there is no correlation between 𝑢𝑖 and 𝑋 
(Gujarati, 2002). Instead of treating 𝛽1𝑖 as fixed, this model assumes that it is a 
random variable with mean value of 𝛽1, without entity specific subscription 
𝑖. Therefore the intercept value for an entity can be expressed as 𝛽1𝑖 = 𝛽1 +  𝜀𝑖, 
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where 𝜀𝑖 is a random error term. This model assumes that the included entities are a 
random sample of a much larger population of such entities and that their intercepts 
have a common mean value and that the differences in the value of their intercepts 
are reflected in the error term 𝜀𝑖. An example of a panel data model with random 
effects is: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑋2𝑖𝑡+𝛽3𝑋3𝑖𝑡 +  𝑤𝑖𝑡  
 
where 𝑖=1, 2, …,N different entities and 𝑡=1,2,…,T different time periods and 
𝑤𝑖𝑡 = 𝜀𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡. The composite error term 𝑤𝑖𝑡  consists of the two components 𝜀𝑖, 
which is the cross-section, or entity-specific, error component and the 𝑢𝑖𝑡, which is 
the combined time series and cross-section error component.  
The random effects model, as described above, assumes that the sample is a ran-
dom draw from a larger population, but this might not always be the case.  
If the number of time series data (𝑇) is large and the number of cross-sectional 
units (𝑁) is small, then it might not be so large differences between the estimations 
of the variables estimated by the random and the fixed effects model. But when 𝑇 
is small and 𝑁 is large the estimates obtained by the two methods can differ signif-
icantly. In this thesis the both methods will be tested.  
4.2 The Model 
To test whether the NOX charge level had an impact on the emission efficiency on 
a firm level, on a sector aggregated as well as sectorial analysis, three different 
regression methods are used. First an OLS pooled model, second a regression with 
fixed effects and third a regression with random effects. Six models are going to be 
tested. Three of them testing the effect of the real charge and three the increase in 
the nominal charge level in 2008, both controlling for the variables time, inflow to 
hydropower plants, global oil price and a lags in emission efficiency. The inflow 
and the global oil price is used in the study by Wikström (2015) and the inflow and 
partly the real charge in the evaluation of the increase of the NOX charge in 2008 
(SEPA, 2012). Time is used in a study by Sterner and Turnheim (2009). The fol-
lowing six models are regressed: 
 
(𝑁𝑂𝑋 /𝐺𝑊ℎ)𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐷08𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡
+ 𝛽5 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑖𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽6(𝑁𝑂𝑋 /𝐺𝑊ℎ)𝑖𝑡−1  + 𝑢𝑖𝑡  
(1) 
(𝑁𝑂𝑋 /𝐺𝑊ℎ)𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡
+ 𝛽5 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑖𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽6(𝑁𝑂𝑋 /𝐺𝑊ℎ)𝑖𝑡−1  + 𝑢𝑖𝑡  
(2) 
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(𝑁𝑂𝑋 /𝐺𝑊ℎ)𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐷08𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡
+ 𝛽4 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑖𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽5(𝑁𝑂𝑋 /𝐺𝑊ℎ)𝑖𝑡−1  + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
(3) 
(𝑁𝑂𝑋 /𝐺𝑊ℎ)𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡
+ 𝛽4 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑖𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽5(𝑁𝑂𝑋 /𝐺𝑊ℎ)𝑖𝑡−1  + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
(4) 
(𝑁𝑂𝑋 /𝐺𝑊ℎ)𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐷08𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡
+ 𝛽5 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑖𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽6(𝑁𝑂𝑋 /𝐺𝑊ℎ)𝑖𝑡−1  + 𝑤𝑖𝑡  
(5) 
(𝑁𝑂𝑋 /𝐺𝑊ℎ)𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡
+ 𝛽5 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑖𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽6(𝑁𝑂𝑋 /𝐺𝑊ℎ)𝑖𝑡−1  + 𝑤𝑖𝑡  
(6) 
where i is firm,  i =1, 2, …, 272, t time, t= 1, 2, …, 22. 𝑢𝑖𝑡is the error term, 𝑤𝑖𝑡  is 
the combined error term and 𝛼𝑖  is the entity (firm) specific intercept for fixed ef-
fects. D08 is a dummy that is 0 before 2008 and 1 after, when the charge was in-
creased. (𝑁𝑂𝑋 /𝐺𝑊ℎ)𝑖𝑡−1 is a term for a lag in the emission efficiency, interpreted 
as that emission efficiency in current period depends on the emission efficiency in 
the last period. The control variables real charge, inflow and the real oil price are 
explained below. The variable time shows that it is a continued improvement of 
emission efficiency over time, in addition to that captured by other variables. Equa-
tions 1-2 are tested with a pooled model, 3-4 with fixed effects and 5-6 with a ran-
dom effects model.  
4.2.1 Analysis on a firm level 
The main assumption in the analysis is that decisions about investment in emission 
abatement technology are taken on a firm level, and not on a production unit level.  
The charge does affect decision makers, managers, and not production units. 
Therefore the analysis is made on a firm level, and not on a production unit level as 
previous studies. A firm with several production units and even several plants 
might decide to increase production on the more efficient production units or plants 
and decrease production on the less efficient production units or plants to decrease 
mean emissions per unit of energy produced for the firm and hence reduce the ex-
posure of the charge for the firm. The firm might also decide to invest in more 
efficient abatement technology on the less efficient production units or plants to 
decrease overall emissions from the firm. Firms might even decide to shut down 
production from old inefficient production units and build new more efficient pro-
duction units. Analysing the data on a production unit level these changes does 
never appear. Then a inefficient production unit with decreased production does 
not change the emission efficiency per production unit, it just appears as decreased 
production, but looking at a firm level it appears as a decreased mean of emissions 
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per produced unit of energy for the firm. When a production unit is taken out of 
function due to a firm decision to invest in a new more efficient production unit, 
looking at a per production unit level this does just appear as a scrapped production 
unit and not as decreased emissions per produced unit of energy. But looking at a 
firm level this does appear as decreased mean of emission per produced unit of 
energy for the firm. That’s why the result on a firm level is different from on a 
production unit level.  
4.2.2 The refunding mechanism 
Analyse the charge and refund system for NOX emissions only focusing on the 
charge might seem a bit remarkable. Specifically when for example Sterner et al., 
(2004) argue that refunding was necessary to be able to implement the policy, to 
cover small production units, diminish incentives for large production units to 
switch to smaller less efficient production units and Sterner and Höglund Isaksson, 
(2006) further argues that the refund mechanism have enabled a charge on a higher 
level then would otherwise be politically feasible to have a significant abatement 
effect. Further according to OECD 2013), the mechanism have stimulated to tech-
nological development. But following the reasoning by Höglund (2000) and 
Söderholm (2013) we can easily conclude that the refunding is not necessary to 
take into consideration. Introducing a simple model, where 𝐶𝑖 is the production 
costs for a representative firm 𝑖, we get; 
 
𝐶𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑒𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖) 
 
where 𝑒𝑖 is unit NOX emissions and 𝑦𝑖 is energy production. Introducing the 
charge 𝑡 per unit NOX emissions and the refunding, the representative cost function 
changes and the firm has to pay for the emissions with 𝑡𝑒𝑖 and receives refunding 
depending on the revenue from the aggregated collected charge, 𝑡Σ𝑒𝑖 = 𝐸, and the 
firms’ energy output as a share of total output, 𝑦𝑖 Σ𝑦𝑖 = 𝑦𝑖 𝑌⁄⁄ . This implies that 
the total production costs for the firm now becomes; 
 
𝐶𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑒𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖) +  𝑡𝑒𝑖 − 𝑡Σ𝑒𝑖(𝑦𝑖 𝑌⁄ ) 
 
assuming that the firm wants to minimise the production costs, which is reason-
able for both private as publicly owned firms, the first order condition for a cost 
minimization w.r.t. 𝑒𝑖 and set this equal to zero we get;  
 
−𝜕𝐶𝑖/𝜕𝑒𝑖 = 𝑡(1 − 𝑦𝑖 𝑌⁄ ) 
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this expression shows that if the firm wants to minimise its cost it will reduce 
NOX emissions until the marginal cost for abatement is equal to the charge times 
the factor that corrects for the firms’ share of the total energy output for all firms. 
One conclusion is hence that the cost for the firm to emit one extra unit of NOX 
emissions is lower than the level of the charge since a part of the charge is refund-
ed. If there were only one firm on the market the incentive to emission abatement 
would equal zero since all the refunding accrues to that single firm. The larger the 
number of firms covered by the charge, the more insecure and less important the 
refunding mechanism becomes. When the market share for the firm approach zero, 
when the number of firms covered by the charge approach infinity, we get the solu-
tion that the firm choses to reduce its NOX emissions until the marginal abatement 
cost is equal to the charge 𝑡. So when there are a large number of small and com-
petitive firms targeted by the refund charge, the marginal abatement cost for reduc-
tion of emissions are approximately equal as under a equivalent Pigouvian tax. The 
number of firm’s covered by the NOX charge is relatively large, 272 in the sample 
in the data and only two firms had a larger market share than 4% during all years of 
observations, and the two largest firms market shares were 5% and 6% respectively 
in 2013. This result is confirmed in a study by Höglund (2005). Since the market 
for firms covered by the NOX charge consists of many and relatively small firms 
this implies that the refunding mechanism should give a marginal incentive to 
emission abatement, given the assumption about cost minimisation.  
4.2.3 The NOX charge in real and nominal value 
The regressions estimate the effects of the real charge and the increase in the 
charge 2008 on the NOX emissions per produced unit of energy. The value of the 
charge has decreased during the period of observation and not been inflation ad-
justed until the increase in the charge 2008. Since the only change in the nominal 
charge is 2008, the regression analysis is therefore limited to test the effect of the 
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nominal charge level by the increase in the charge 2008. The initial level of the 
nitrogen oxide charge was 40 SEK per emitted kilo of NOX in year 1992 when the 
charge was implemented. The nominal value of the charge was constant until 2008 
when the charge was increased to 50 SEK per kg of NOX emissions in nominal 
terms. The real value of the charge has been calculated in 1992 years price value 
using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) (SCB, 2015b). The real value of the charge 
has been decreasing with 20% from 1992 until 2007. The new nominal level of 50 
SEK did however never exceed the real value of the initial level of the charge in 
1992 years value, but it instead was 38,65 SEK in real value in 1992 years value. 
Therefore the increase of the charge in 2008 was rather an inflation adjustment to 
compensate for several years of falling real value, than a real increase in the 
charge. After 2008 the real value of the charge has been decreasing again. Below is 
a figure of the real and nominal value of the charge during the period of observa-
tion, between the years 1992 – 2013.  
4.2.4 Inflow to hydropower plants 
Weather is one variable that could explain NOX emissions, since the weather and 
the climate affect the energy production. Annual mean temperature could be one 
such variable explaining changes in energy production. In Sweden data about an-
nual mean temperature is only found at a regional level and not on a national level. 
Unfortunately information about the firms region is not available. Further more 
even if regional data were available on production unit level from the original data 
set, one firm can have production units in different regions and when collapsing 
data to firm level this further complicates the situation. Therefore annual mean 
temperature is hard to use. However cold winters in combination with low hydro-
power production capacity leads to increases in emissions (SEPA, 2012). Under 
those circumstances the demand of charge-obliged energy will increase and pro-
duction units that are usually not in use, and less emissions efficient, will be re-
sumed. How the weather is affecting NOX emissions is therefore best captured by 
the production capacity by the hydropower, which in turn depends on the precipita-
tion and is best described by the inflow, also called runoff, that is a measure of the 
flow during a certain period. According to this the variable inflow is used for con-
trolling for fluctuations in the weather and how it affects the emission efficiency. 
Statistics about annual quantity of the runoff for hydro power plants in Sweden, for 
the period 1992 – 2013, is received from Swedish Energy (Svensk Energi, 2015) 
and is expressed in Terra Watt Hours (TWh) per year. The inflow, or the runoff, 
from the hydropower plants in Sweden is shown in the figure below. The inflow 
has been annually fluctuating between 50,3 and 83,8 TWh. 
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4.2.5 The global oil price 
The price on oil is another variable used as a control variable in the regression 
analysis. The price is the annual mean price of oil inclusive the Swedish tax on oil, 
collected from The Swedish Petroleum and Biofuel Institute (SPBI, 2015). The oil 
price has been recalculated to real price in 1992 years price value using CPI. Prices 
on other fuels as bioenergy could be used, but the price on bioenergy is to a large 
extent determined locally in Sweden and could therefore be affected by the NOX 
charge (Wikström, 2015) and then biased. That’s why it is not used. The price on 
oil is, on the other hand, to a large extent determined on the global oil market and 
not particularly affected by Swedish local taxes and regulations. 
The oil price has been increasing with 147,5% in nominal terms and 83% in real 
terms during the period of observation.  
 
Figure 4.2 Inflow to hydro power plants, TWh 
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Figure 4.3 Nominal and real oil price, SEK/ton 
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5 Results 
The results from the regressions that estimates the effect of the real charge and the 
increase on the nominal charge 2008 is presented below, in a sector aggregated 
analysis as well as a sectorial analysis from the models 1-6 stated in the methodol-
ogy section. All variables are estimated in natural logarithms. 
5.1 Sector aggregated analysis  
Below are the results from the pooled, fixed effects and random effects model re-
gressions. Table 5.1 presents the estimations for the coefficients for the real charge 
and table 5.2 presents the estimations for the coefficients for the increase in the 
nominal charge 2008. The estimation for the real charge from the pooled, linear, 
regression model, (table 5.1) is – 0,1 and statistically significant at a 10% level. All 
other variables are significant at a 1% level, except the inflow that is significant at 
a 5% level. This means that an increase in the real charge with one unit reduces 
NOX emissions per unit of produced energy by 10%. A correspondingly increase in 
the inflow decrease the emissions by 5,8% and a one unit increase in the real oil 
price decrease the emissions by 8,3%.  
The estimation of the real charge from the fixed effects model is negative with 
an estimation of – 0,05, but not statistically significant. The estimation for the con-
trol variable time is – 0.003 and significant at a 5% level. The estimation for the 
inflow is – 0,05 and significant at a 10% level. The estimation for the lag is 0,7 and 
significant at a 1% level. The estimation for the real oil price is negative but not 
statistically significant. The estimation for the real charge from the random effects 
model is negative but not statistically significant. The estimations for the real oil 
price and the lag in emission efficiency are negative and positive respectively and 
both significant at a 1% level. The estimator for time is positive and significant at a 
10 level and the estimation for the inflow is negative and significant at a 5% level.  
 
 
 
23 
 Pooled Model Fixed Effects Model Random Effects Model 
Real charge -0.101* -0.0516 -0.0830 
 (0.0537) (0.0596) (0.0541) 
    
Time 0.00415*** -0.00345** 0.00238* 
 (0.00122) (0.00164) (0.00123) 
    
Inflow -0.0583** -0.0484* -0.0554** 
 (0.0275) (0.0260) (0.0271) 
    
Real oil price -0.0831*** -0.0357 -0.0711*** 
 (0.0229) (0.0247) (0.0225) 
    
Previous period 0.902*** 0.702*** 0.856*** 
 (0.0129) (0.0305) (0.0159) 
    
Constant 1.770*** 2.361*** 1.868*** 
 (0.298) (0.285) (0.290) 
Observations 3629 3629 3629 
R2 0.817 0.588 0.583 
Wald-test / 2 1069.6 173.7 3273.52 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Table 5.1. Regression estimators for the real charge, sector aggregated analysis 
 
The model for the impact of the real charge on NOX/GWh with the results from 
the pooled model, then becomes: 
 
(𝑁𝑂𝑋 /𝐺𝑊ℎ)𝑖𝑡 = 1.77 − 0.1𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 + 0.004𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 − 0.06𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡
− 0.08𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑖𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡 + 0.9(𝑁𝑂𝑋 /𝐺𝑊ℎ)𝑖𝑡−1  + 𝑢𝑖𝑡  
 
To illustrate the model for the emission efficiency for example the emissions per 
produced unit of energy from the district heating plant in Haparanda for year 2002 
can be calculated; 
 
(𝑁𝑂𝑋 /𝐺𝑊ℎ)𝐻𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎,2002
= 1.77 − 0.1𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒2002 + 0.004𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒2002 − 0.06𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤2002
− 0.08𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑖𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒2002 + 0.9(𝑁𝑂𝑋 /𝐺𝑊ℎ)2001  + 𝑢𝐻𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎,2002 
 
6.615 =  1.77 − 0.1 ∗ 3.53 + 0.004 ∗ 11 − 0.06 ∗ 4.03 − 0.08 ∗ 8.26 + 0.9 ∗ 6.73 
 
The estimation of the model corresponds well with the actual value in the data, 
which is 6.674 (in natural logarithm), which is 791.8 kg NOX emissions per GWh. 
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The results for the models for the increase in the nominal charge in 2008 (table 
5.2), on a sector aggregated analysis, shows that regressing a pooled model the 
difference between before and after 2008 the difference is -0.023, significant at a 
5% level on a firm level.  The control variables time, the real oil price and the 
emission efficiency lag are statistically significant at a 0,1% level and the estimator 
for the inflow is significant at a 5% level. This means that the increase in the 
charge level in 2008 decreased emission per produced unit of energy by 2,3%.  
The estimator for the increase in the charge is negative but not significant in the 
fixed effects model. The model neither shows significant results for none of the 
estimators except the lag that is significant at a 1% level.  
The estimation for D08 in the random effects model is negative with a value of – 
0,02 and significant at a 10% level. The estimations for the variables time and in-
flow are significant at a 5% level and the estimations for the real oil price and the 
efficiency lag are significant at a 1% level. This means that the increase in the 
charge in 2008 decreased emissions by 1,9%.  
 
 Pooled Model Fixed Effects Model Random Effects Model 
D08 -0.0231** -0.0132 -0.0193* 
 (0.0110) (0.0123) (0.0111) 
    
Time 0.00533*** -0.00279 0.00335** 
 (0.00135) (0.00186) (0.00137) 
    
Inflow -0.0593** -0.0486* -0.0562** 
 (0.0274) (0.0259) (0.0270) 
    
Real oil price -0.0787*** -0.0327 -0.0671*** 
 (0.0231) (0.0248) (0.0227) 
    
Previous period 0.902*** 0.702*** 0.856*** 
 (0.0129) (0.0305) (0.0160) 
    
Constant 1.367*** 2.148*** 1.537*** 
 (0.245) (0.241) (0.239) 
Observations 3629 3629 3629 
R2 0.817 0.588 0.583 
Wald-test / 2 1070.2 173.2 3264.78 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Table 5.2. Regression estimators for D08, sector aggregated analysis 
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Using the results from the pooled model the model for NOX/GWh and the in-
crease in the charge in 2008 becomes; 
 
(𝑁𝑂𝑋 /𝐺𝑊ℎ)𝑖𝑡 = 1.37 − 0.023𝐷08𝑖𝑡 + 0.005𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 − 0.06𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡
− 0.08𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑖𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡 + 0.9(𝑁𝑂𝑋 /𝐺𝑊ℎ)𝑖𝑡−1  + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
 
The Wald-test, the F-statistic test, tests if the coefficients on the regressors are 
all jointly zero. The Wald test for the pooled and the fixed effects model shows that 
all coefficients are highly statistically significant for both the real charge model as 
well as the D08 model. So the models are significant. Leading to the rejection of 
the hypothesis that together the coefficients have no effect on the emission effi-
ciency, since the critical value is about 3,15 with 5% significance level and 4,98 
with 1% level (Gujarati, 2002). The 2 that is obtained for the random effects mod-
el indicate that jointly the coefficient in the model are significant in both the real 
charge and the D08 model.  
The multiple coefficient of determination, R2 that measures the goodness of fit 
of the equation, gives the proportion or percentage of the total variation in the de-
pendent variable Y explained by the explanatory variables X1, …Xn jointly 
(Gujarati, 2002). The value of R2 lies between 0 and 1 and the closer R2 is to 1 the 
“better” is the fit of the model. The R2 in the sector aggregated analysis with the 
pooled and fixed effects models are 0,8 and 0,6 respectively both for the real 
charge as the D08 model. 
In conclusion the estimations for the real charge and the increase in the nominal 
charge in 2008 are all negative in their impact on NOX emissions per produced unit 
of energy on a firm level in both the pooled, fixed effects and random effects mod-
el. A statistically significant estimation is attained from the pooled model for the 
real charge and from the pooled and the random effects model for the increase on 
the charge on 2008.  
5.2 Sectorial analysis 
The seven different sectors covered by the NOX charge are diverse to their nature 
and it’s irrational to presume that the charge would affect them equally. Doing a 
sectorial analysis these differences between the sectors appears. All sectors are 
regressed with a linear OLS model, a pooled model, and all control variables; the 
real charge or D08, time, the inflow to hydro power plants the real global oil price 
and the lag for the emission efficiency. The inflow is not of significant weight for 
all sectors, but controlling for an extra variable that is not important does not dis-
turb the regression results significant, and the variable is therefore kept for all sec-
tors. Table 5.3. on page 28 presents the coefficient estimations for the real charge 
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and table 5.4. on page 29 presents the coefficient results for the increase in the 
charge 2008, both for a sectorial analysis.  
The result from the regression for the real charge shows that the estimation for 
the real charge is negative for the sectors chemical production, power- & heat gen-
eration, food industry, paper- & pulp industry and wood industry. But the only 
sector that the real charge have a statistically significant negative effect on is the 
wood industry. The estimation for the impact of the real charge on NOX emissions 
per produced unit of energy in wood industry is – 0,36, significant at a 1% level. 
The control variable emission efficiency in previous period is statistically signifi-
cant at a 1% level. This means that a one unit increase in the real charge reduced 
emission with 36% in the wood industry. For the power- and heat generation all 
other control variables except the real charge are significant at a 1% level, except 
the inflow, which is significant at a 5% level. 
In the results from the D08 regression the estimation for the increase in the 
charge in 2008 is negative for all sectors except the waste incineration and the met-
al manufacturing. But the only sector in which the increase in the charge had a 
negatively statistically significant is, again, the wood industry with an estimation 
for the impact on NOX emissions per produced unit of energy of – 0,076. The lag in 
emission efficiency is the only significant control variable with an estimation of 
0,7, significant on a 1% level. This means that the increase in the nominal charge 
level in 2008 reduced NOX emissions per produced unit of energy by 7,6%. For the 
sector power- & heat production estimators for all variables except the increase in 
the charge are significant at a 1% level, except inflow that is significant at a 5% 
level.  
 
The variable inflow shows the highest significance for the power- and heat gen-
eration both in the regression for the real charge as in the regression for the in-
crease in the charge level in 2008. This is expected, since this is the sector that to 
the largest extent is affected by the hydropower production.  
The control variable for emission efficiency in previous period is significant for 
all sectors at a 1% level in both the regression for the real charge as for the D08. 
This shows that the current emission efficiency to a large extent is determined by 
the emission efficiency in the previous period. This also concludes that including a 
lag for emission efficiency is important in a regression model analysing the NOX 
charge.  
The sectors food industry, metal manufacturing and chemical all have low num-
ber of observations since there are very few firms in these sectors, only 12 in the 
food industry, 4 in the metal manufacturing and 18 in the chemical production. 
Therefore some variables are omitted and Wald-test could therefore not be calcu-
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lated for the metal manufacturing. Therefore no conclusions could be drawn from 
the regression for these sectors.  
Probably also the sector aggregated regression analysis would benefit from ex-
cluding the sectors food industry, metal manufacturing and chemical production. In 
a sectorial analysis these sectors shows low significance, specifically the metal 
manufacturing. From this result it is probably a good idea in further research to 
exclude the metal manufacturing and the food industry and perhaps also the chemi-
cal production from the sector aggregated analysis. 
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Waste  
incineration 
Chemical  
production 
Power & heat 
generation 
Food  
industry 
Paper & pulp 
industry 
Metal  
manufacturing 
Wood  
industry 
Real charge 0.0402 -0.323 -0.0175 -0.132 -0.153 0.0468 -0.363*** 
 (0.161) (0.252) (0.0846) (0.203) (0.108) (1.230) (0.109) 
        
Time 0.00379 0.00242 0.00696*** -0.00297 0.00157 -0.000565 0.000168 
 (0.00347) (0.00562) (0.00183) (0.00721) (0.00205) (0.0139) (0.00438) 
        
Inflow -0.0284 -0.309* -0.112** 0.158 0.00244 0.0389 0.0594 
 (0.0634) (0.160) (0.0446) (0.139) (0.0348) (0.421) (0.0479) 
        
Real oil price -0.127* -0.201* -0.116*** 0.0566 -0.0640 0.0180 0.0324 
 (0.0625) (0.102) (0.0330) (0.127) (0.0423) (0.227) (0.0693) 
        
Previous period 0.876*** 0.919*** 0.879*** 0.919*** 0.882*** 0.722*** 0.697*** 
 (0.0291) (0.0323) (0.0251) (0.0364) (0.0253) (0.0726) (0.0651) 
        
Constant 1.627** 4.490** 2.055*** -0.242 1.717*** 1.051 2.519*** 
 (0.724) (1.576) (0.446) (1.683) (0.518) (1.263) (0.733) 
Observations 470 256 1559 142 731 45 426 
R2 0.814 0.834 0.789 0.839 0.798 0.615 0.605 
Wald-test 252.9 505.4 270.0 463.6 500.2 . 53.62 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Table 5.3 Regression estimators for the real charge, sectorial analysis 
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Waste  
incineration 
Chemical 
production 
Power & heat 
generation 
Food  
industry 
Paper & pulp 
industry 
Metal  
manufacturing 
Wood  
industry 
D08 0.00862 -0.0675 -0.00582 -0.0537 -0.0330 0.00989 -0.0755*** 
 (0.0333) (0.0509) (0.0172) (0.0471) (0.0223) (0.277) (0.0223) 
        
Time 0.00335 0.00595 0.00725*** -0.000565 0.00328 -0.00108 0.00410 
 (0.00415) (0.00550) (0.00206) (0.00769) (0.00237) (0.00214) (0.00441) 
        
Inflow -0.0278 -0.315* -0.112** 0.161 0.00000757 0.0395 0.0548 
 (0.0622) (0.159) (0.0447) (0.141) (0.0350) (0.407) (0.0470) 
        
Real oil price -0.129** -0.191* -0.115*** 0.0752 -0.0586 0.0163 0.0451 
 (0.0620) (0.101) (0.0335) (0.131) (0.0428) (0.281) (0.0713) 
        
Previous period 0.876*** 0.919*** 0.879*** 0.918*** 0.881*** 0.722*** 0.697*** 
 (0.0290) (0.0323) (0.0251) (0.0373) (0.0253) (0.0709) (0.0652) 
        
Constant 1.784*** 3.253*** 1.975*** -0.893 1.122*** 1.233 1.106 
 (0.632) (1.090) (0.370) (1.419) (0.362) (3.778) (0.693) 
Observations 470 256 1559 142 731 45 426 
R2 0.814 0.834 0.789 0.839 0.798 0.615 0.606 
Wald-test 246.4 422.5 269.9 471.0 496.8 . 53.12 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Table 5.4. Regression estimators for D08, sectorial analysis
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6 Discussion 
Scale of production is affecting emission efficiency. The data shows that all large 
firms are efficient, small firms can be both efficient and inefficient, but all ineffi-
cient firms are small. It seems that size does matter for the firms’ emission effi-
ciency of emitted NOX per produced unit of energy. Below is a plot in logarithmic 
scale of emission efficiency per size of the firm. Size of the firm is measured in 
annual produced GWh. The scale advantage could be explained by that capital 
intensity increase in larger firms and by the existence of indivisibilities in techno-
logical options as well as a higher technological capacity of larger firms (Sterner 
and Turnheim, 2009). Technology absorption and the acquirement of knowledge to 
a large extent depends on access to information, finance and the level of engage-
ment in R&D and innovation activities, which all seems to be dependent on scale. 
Further the price of abatement technology is not a linear function of unit size, 
which leads to disadvantages for smaller firms. Some technological devices are not 
even commercially available under a certain size level (Sterner and Turnheim, 
2009). The firm size is not included in the regression models, since it is correlated 
with the dependent variable, but it is an important factor to take into consideration.  
Without the refund the charge would function as a conventional Pigouvian emis-
 
Figure 6.1. Scatter of log kg NOX emissions per GWh on log GWh, fitted line is 
mean for all sectors 
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sion tax and the abatement incentives are practically the same under a charge and 
refund system as under an equivalent Pigouvian tax (Höglund, 2000), however 
firms are less opposed to a charge and refund system. This can be explained by the 
fact that the marginal cost of abatement is almost the same as the charge level but 
the average net payment is much lower due to the refund mechanism (Sterner and 
Höglund Isaksson, 2006). Even though the refund mechanism does not distort the 
abatement behaviour of the firms, is does affect the output level and may therefore 
indirectly lead to a higher overall emission level from targeted plants than would 
have resulted from a conventional emission tax (Höglund, 2000).  
The refund mechanism further counteract a price increase of the polluting pro-
duced good, even though this leads to benefits for the consumer this is however 
one of the disadvantages of refunding. By having little impact on the relative prices 
of products whose production involves high levels of emissions, it does not dis-
courage demand for these products. Polluters further does not pay the full envi-
ronmental cost of the pollution that their production processes causes. This since 
the charge and refund system does not follow the polluter pays principle (PPP) 
with respect to unabated pollution. Since too many productive resources are allo-
cated to emission intensive production relative to cleaner production this leads to a 
welfare loss for the society.  
 
In year 2010 it was a decrease in emission efficiency. The same year it was a dip 
in the global oil price. So the lower emission efficiency could be explained by in-
creased production due to cheaper fuel costs, but it was also an unusually cold win-
ter. In the data it appears production units that are usually not covered by the NOX 
charge, since they normally produce less then 25 GWh annually. Production from 
several firms usually covered by the NOX charge did also increase. The decrease in 
emission efficiency could also be due to higher production on smaller production 
units that on average are less efficient. It could also be explained by the fact that 
there was a higher production in general than normally causing higher emissions 
per produced unit of energy since the technical device of the production units not 
was adjusted for that level of production. So the temporary decrease in emission 
efficiency could be explained by both the decease in the global oil price or the unu-
sually cold winter, or the combination of them. 
 
Another aspect to take into consideration is the conflict between NOX abatement 
and abatement of other emissions. NOX abatement often implies increases in emis-
sions of carbon monoxide (CO), dinitrogen oxide (N2O) and ammonia (NH3) which 
partly offset the social environmental gain from reduction in NOX emissions 
(Höglund, 2000). Optimal combustion, which occur in high temperatures, lower the 
levels of for example CO2 emission and leads to higher energy efficiency, but NOX 
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emissions increase by temperature and it is therefore a trade off between NOX 
abatement and abatement of other pollutions and energy efficiency. 
 
The decrease of the real value of the NOX charge has lowered the incentive for 
emission abatement and to avoid undermine of abatement incentives it is important 
to adjust the charge level for the inflation. 
 
The distribution of ownership, public- and private ownership, is uneven in the 
different sectors. Publicly owned firms can have other abatement reasons than pure 
cost minimization, as political policies and resolutions. Waste incinerating and 
power and heat generating firms are to a larger extent publicly owned then other 
sectors and this is also one of the sectors with the largest increase in emission effi-
ciency, a result also found by Bonilla et al., (2015). Ownership is one other aspect 
that could affect emission efficiency, an aspect which in future studies could be 
interesting to estimate, whether ownership has an significant impact on emission 
efficiency.   
The majority of the production units, and the firm’s, are subjected to pollution 
permits, as stated in the background, therefore the reduction of emission intensity 
per produced unit of energy is a result of a combination of the two environmental 
policies the NOX charge and the pollution permits. 
So in conclusion, there are several other aspects affecting the emission efficiency 
then the ones stated in this study, some of them are the pollution permits, owner-
ship as well as fuel choices and environmental policies for other pollutions. 
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7 Conclusions 
Energy output has increased, emissions decreased and emission efficiency remark-
ably increased during the period 1992 to 2013 for the firms covered by the charge 
and refund system for the nitrogen oxides in Sweden. The sectors with the largest 
increase in emission efficiency are waste incineration, chemical industry and pow-
er- and heat generation.  
In a sector aggregated analysis the estimations from a pooled regression model is 
negative and statistically significant impact on NOX emissions per produced unit of 
energy on a firm level for both the real charge as the increased in the nominal 
charge in 2008, controlling for the variables time, inflow from hydro power plants, 
the global real oil price and a lag for emission efficiency. The random effects mod-
el also provides a significant negative effect of the nominal increase in the charge 
level. The result demonstrates that a one unit increase in the real charge level de-
creased emissions per produced unit of energy by 10% during the period 1992 to 
2013. The nominal increase in the charge reduced emissions by 2,3%.  
In a sectorial analysis the estimations for the real charge and the increase in the 
nominal charge in 2008 is negative for the sectors chemical production, power- & 
heat generation, food industry, paper- & pulp industry and wood industry. A statis-
tically significant estimation for the real charge and the increase in the nominal 
charge is provided for the wood industry. A one unit increase in the real charge 
decreased emissions by 36% and the increase in the charge level decreased emis-
sions by 7,6%.  
In conclusion, referring to the results from the pooled and the random effects 
model, we can reject the null hypothesis that the NOX charge did not have any im-
pact on emission efficiency in a sector aggregated analysis and in the wood indus-
try in a sectorial analysis.  
Several other aspects affect the emission efficiency that has not been taken into 
consideration in this study. Some of them are the pollution permits, ownership as 
well as fuel choices and environmental policies for other pollutions. 
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